安樂哲 著《一多不分：儒學(xué)與世界文化新秩序》出版
安樂哲 著《一多不分：儒學(xué)與世界文化新秩序》出版
書名：《一多不分：儒學(xué)與世界文化新秩序》
主編：[美]安樂哲
出版社：山東友誼出版社
【內(nèi)容簡介】
本書收錄儒學(xué)大家安樂哲先生近年來的論文集、演講稿和訪談錄。在本書中，安樂哲先生在比較中西兩大傳統(tǒng)闡釋的大視野下，用中國“一多不分”互系性話語體系，講述儒家思想對個人修養(yǎng)、家庭和社會的價值，以及對人工智能等新興領(lǐng)域的哲學(xué)思考。安樂哲先生認(rèn)為，儒家思想是生機(jī)盎然、充滿活力與包容性的思想傳統(tǒng)，儒家角色倫理根深深植于家國關(guān)系之中，依然生生不息，可以成為全球性哲學(xué)、思想與文化資源的重要部分，可以預(yù)見，儒家角色倫理學(xué)將會為促進(jìn)世界新經(jīng)濟(jì)和新文化秩序做出積極貢獻(xiàn)。
【作者簡介】
安樂哲，1947年出生于加拿大多倫多，世界著名中西比較哲學(xué)家，國際知名漢學(xué)大師，山東省“儒學(xué)大家”，孔子研究院特聘專家。曾任夏威夷大學(xué)哲學(xué)系教授，現(xiàn)任北京大學(xué)哲學(xué)系人文講席教授，世界儒學(xué)文化研究聯(lián)合會會長，國際儒學(xué)聯(lián)合會副會長，尼山圣源書院顧問，北京中外文化交流研究基地顧問，北京外國語大學(xué)中華文化國際傳播研究院外籍首席專家。
2013年因其對中國思想多年來的出色研究獲得“孔子文化獎”。2016年，榮獲第二屆“會林文化獎”。2018年，榮獲“文明之光·2018中國文化交流年度人物”；并榮獲“北京大學(xué)燕園友誼獎”；2019年，榮獲“杜威學(xué)術(shù)學(xué)會2019終身成就獎”；2021年，榮獲“中國政府友誼獎”。安樂哲教授翻譯了《論語》、《大學(xué)》、《中庸》、《道德經(jīng)》、《孝經(jīng)》、《淮南子》、《孫子兵法》等書而蜚聲海內(nèi)外，著有：《儒家角色倫理學(xué)》、《儒家角色倫理——21世紀(jì)道德視野》《先賢的民主：杜威、孔子與中國民主之希望》《通過漢代而思》《主術(shù)：中國古代政冶制度之研究》《通過孔子而思》等。
【目錄】
序言
第一部分講稿：儒學(xué)與第二次啟蒙
知己知彼：中西闡釋域境的相互鏡鑒
古代人類兼容并蓄的天下觀在當(dāng)代世界的綿延呈現(xiàn)
儒學(xué)之“人”對改變世界文化秩序的作用
儒學(xué)價值觀與第二次啟蒙時代
適應(yīng)需求，融合發(fā)展——儒學(xué)文化的變通發(fā)展動力
儒學(xué)與新絲綢之路
第二部分訪談：儒學(xué)與全球合作共贏
哲學(xué)的最后一站不是真理，而是智性對話
儒者·儒行·儒學(xué)
“西儒”是怎樣看“東儒”的？
哲人譯哲：中國哲學(xué)典籍英譯路徑探析
借用儒學(xué)“仁”的觀念實(shí)現(xiàn)全球合作共贏
中西對話的拓荒者：哲學(xué)與漢學(xué)之間的比較哲學(xué)家
儒家中國與變化中的世界秩序
第三部分論文：儒學(xué)將重塑世界文化
人類命運(yùn)共同體：“一多不分”的新世界文化秩序
卸下本質(zhì)主義的指控：對文化哲學(xué)的一些方法論思考
《學(xué)記》——立儒家教育之根本
“學(xué)以成人”：論儒學(xué)對世界文化秩序變化的貢獻(xiàn)
“人”還是“成人”：陽明學(xué)知行合一思想的源流
余紀(jì)元與為儒家哲學(xué)而翻新“形而上學(xué)”
——人“生而既成”還是“做人成仁”？
人工智能：將“自然智能”置于《易經(jīng)》宇宙論的框架之內(nèi)
湯一介先生的哲學(xué)饋贈——讓東西方哲學(xué)的不對稱成為過去
后記
【序言】
Preface
Roger T.Ames
The title of this book is 一多不分. And from the beginning, the 安樂哲儒學(xué)大家團(tuán)體 has itself been a demonstration of this fundamental Confucian postulate. The articles, lectures, and interviews, contained in this volume tell the story of our team—Tian Chenshan, Wen Haiming, Zhang Kai, Bian Junfeng, and Sun Zhihui—have over the past five years criss-crossed China, East-Asia, and the world promoting a better understanding of Confucian philosophy. Together we have set our root 扎根 and grown 生長our project with a “duo 多“ that has enabled us to become a unique “yi一.” We have enjoyed the partnership of and joined in common cause with the Kongzi Yanjiuyuan, the World Consortium for Research in Confucian Cultures, the International Confucian Association, the Peking University Berggruen Research Center, the Beiwai Sinology Center, the Beishida Academy for the International Communication of Chinese Culture, the Danyang Traditional Culture Society, the Dewey Center at Fudan University, and many other wonderful organizations.
Over the past generation, a sea change has occurred in the economic and political order of the world, and we have anticipated that this great transformation will be followed by the emergence of a new world cultural order. And we believe firmly that the pan-Asian tradition of Confucian philosophy has an important contribution to make to the dawning of this new world order. The rise of East Asia and of China in particular has been precipitous, and has in many ways startled a world dominated by the liberal values of a foundational individualism. A fundamental premise that runs throughout these pages is that the most important contribution this Confucian tradition has to make to a changing world cultural order is an alternative to the ideology of individualism.We must locate this notion of a relationally-constituted conception of “human becomings” within the generic features of an early Chinese process or “event” ontology in which putative “things” and their contexts are interdependent and thus inseparable. What it means to become human, far from referencing an antecedent given that takes us back to our origins (eidos) or forward to some given, pre-determined end (telos), is in fact a provisional and emergent process within the context of an evolving cosmic order. It is just such a worldview that I and my collaborators following Marcel Granet, Tang Junyi, Fei Xiaotong, Joseph Needham, and Angus Graham have argued for at length as the most appropriate interpretive context for understanding classical Confucianism.
As my starting point, I have posited a contrast between a classical Greek ontological conception of human “beings” and a classical Yijing 易經(jīng)orBook of Changes process conception of what I will call human “becomings,” a contrast between “on-tology” as “the science of being per se” and what I will call “zoe-tology” (shengshenglun 生生論) as “the art of living,” a contrast between a human being as a noun and human becomings as a gerunds. John Dewey abjuring what he calls “the philosophical fallacy” makes this same point in alerting us to our inveterate habit of decontextualizing and essentializing one element within the continuity of experience, and then in our best efforts to overcome this post hoc diremption, of then construing this same element as foundational and causal. As a concrete example of this habit, we achieve virtuosity in the process of our ongoing conduct, abstract something called “virtue” out of the complexity of this continuing experience, and then make the abstraction antecedent to and causal of the process itself. For Dewey,
…the reality is the growth-process itself . . . The real existence is the history in its entirety, the history just as what it is. The operations of splitting it up into two parts and then having to unite them again by appeal to causative power are equally arbitrary and gratuitous.
The classical Greeks give us a substance ontology grounded in “being qua being” or “being per se” (to on he on) that guarantees a permanent and unchanging subject as the substratum for the human experience. With the combination of eidosand telos as the formal and final cause of independent things such as persons, this “sub-stance” necessarily persists through change. This kind of causal thinking is precisely what Dewey is referencing in his concern about the philosophical fallacy. In this ontology, “to exist” and “to be” are implicated in one term. The same copula verb answers the two-fold questions of first why something exists, that is, its origins and its goal, and then whatit is, its substance. This substratum or essence includes its purpose for being, and is defining of the “what-it-means-to-be-a-thing-of-this-kind” of any particular thing in setting a closed, exclusive boundary and the strict identity necessary for it to be this, and not that.
The question of why something exists is answered by an appeal to determinative, originative, and undemonstrable first principles (Gk.arche, L. principium), and provides the metaphysical separation between creator and creature. The question of what something is, is answered by its limitation and definition, and provides the ontological distinction between substance and accident, between essence and its contingent attributes. In expressing the necessity, self-sufficiency, and independence of things, this substance or essence as the subject of predication is the object of knowledge. It tells us, as a matter of logical necessity, what is what, and is the source of truth in revealing to us with certainty, what is real and what is not. As the contemporary philosopher Zhao Tingyang 趙汀陽avers, this kind of substance ontology defining the real things that constitute the content of an orderly and structured cosmos
…provides a “dictionary” kind of explanation of the world, seeking to set up an accurate understanding of the limits of all things. In simple terms, it determines “what is what” and all concepts are footnotes to “being” or “is.”
In the Book of Changes we find a vocabulary that makes explicit cosmological assumptions that are a stark alternative to this substance ontology, and provides the interpretive context for the Confucian canons by locating them within a holistic, organic, and ecological worldview. This cosmology begins from “l(fā)iving” (sheng 生) itself as the motive force behind change, and gives us a world of boundless “becomings:” not “things” that are, but “events” that are happening. The ontological intuition that “only Being is” is at the core of Parmenides’s treatise The Way of Truth and is the basis of the ontology that follows from it.To provide a meaningful contrast with this fundamental assumption of on or “being” we might borrow the Greek notion of zoe or “l(fā)ife” and create the neologism “zoe-tology” as “the art of living.” Zoetology standing in contrast to Greek “ontology,” might be translated into modern Chinese as 生生論shengshenglun. The Book of Changes states that 天地之大德曰生“the greatest capacity of the cosmos is its life-force.” Again, in describing the unfolding confluence of vital “way-making” (dao 道) it observes that 生生之謂易 “it is the ceaseless generating and procreating of life that is meant by ‘change’” (yi 易). Change itself is defined denotatively and thus specifically as procreative living.
In this Book of Changes ecological cosmology, autopoietic, transactional change occurs synchronically in situ and diachronically in media res as expansive and advantageous growth in the vital, situated relations that constitute experience. The interactions of mutual interest expressed among things in their constitutive relations grows and “appreciates” them in the sense of adding value to both themselves and their worlds. Just as human flourishing arises from positive growth in the relations of family and community, cosmic flourishing is isomorphic as an extension of this same kind of transactional growth but only on a more expansive scale. Indeed, human values and a moral cosmic order are both grounded in life and its productive growth, and are thus continuous with each other as complementaries.
The single most important common denominator within the various areas of the Confucian cultural sensorium rehearsed in these pages, from education to ethics, from family to cosmology, is the relationally-constituted conception of persons. In this monograph, then, I have made the argument that the most important contribution Confucian philosophy has to offer our times is precisely its own elaborate, sophisticated, and ethically compelling conception of a relationally-constituted persons that can be drawn upon to critique and to challenge the entrenched ideology of foundational individualism. In particular, at a critical time when we can fairly anticipate a quantum transformation in the changing world cultural order, it is this alternative conception of persons as human becomings that recommends most clearly to me that we would do well to give Confucianism its place at the table.
The argument in these pages has not been that the Confucian values I am advocating can be mustered to solve all of the world’s problems. Nor has the argument been that the ineluctable forces of Westernization are pernicious and need to somehow be contained. Instead, my attempt to bring attention to the Confucian tradition has been that we do well to make room for all of the cultural resources available to us at a time when the most dramatic changes to the human condition in the history of our species are gathering on the horizon. In many ways, the position advanced herein has been compensatory, trying to overcome the kind of ignorance that comes with the uncritical ignoring of an ancient tradition integral to the identity of a quarter of the world’s population. There is much to be valued in this Confucian cultural tradition as a source of enrichment for world culture and as a substantial critique of our existing values, and we would all do well to know it much better than we do.
序言
從一開始，我們安樂哲儒學(xué)大家團(tuán)隊(duì)便努力實(shí)現(xiàn)我們的儒學(xué)理念。該書中涉及的講座、訪談和論文講述了我們團(tuán)隊(duì)的故事（成員有田辰山、溫海明、張凱、卞俊峰和孫智慧）的故事。在過去的五年，他們行走于中國各地乃至東亞和世界其他地區(qū)的多個國家，走訪學(xué)習(xí)，促進(jìn)大家對儒家哲學(xué)的理解。我們一起深入探討、研究課題，從最初對該課題之“多”得以宏觀掌握，到后來對“一”有了微觀細(xì)致、獨(dú)一無二的了解。我們與尼山世界儒學(xué)中心孔子研究院、世界儒學(xué)文化研究聯(lián)合會（World Consortium for Research in Confucian Cultures）、國際儒學(xué)聯(lián)合會、北京大學(xué)博古睿研究中心、北京外國語大學(xué)東西方關(guān)系中心、北京師范大學(xué)中國文化國際傳播研究院、江蘇省丹陽市中華傳統(tǒng)文化學(xué)會、復(fù)旦大學(xué)杜威研究中心以及其他卓越的機(jī)構(gòu)建立了共同研究，彼此分享的合作關(guān)系。
在過去的一代人的時間里，世界的經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治秩序發(fā)生了巨變，我們已經(jīng)預(yù)見到這種巨大的變化將伴隨著新世界文化秩序的出現(xiàn)。我們堅信，儒家哲學(xué)的泛亞洲（pan-Asian）傳統(tǒng)對這一新世界秩序的產(chǎn)生做出過重要貢獻(xiàn)。東亞尤其是中國的迅速崛起在許多方面震驚了以個人主義為根基的自由主義價值觀主導(dǎo)的世界。本書的基本論調(diào)是，儒家傳統(tǒng)對不斷變化的世界文化秩序必然能夠做出的最重要貢獻(xiàn)，是可能替代個人主義意識形態(tài)的貢獻(xiàn)的。我們要把這種關(guān)系構(gòu)成的“人”（human becomings）的概念置于中國早期過程或“事件”本體論的一般特征之中。在這種本體論中，給予的“事物”與其語境是相互依存、不可分割的。“成人”的意義，遠(yuǎn)不是指參考一個給定的前因，幫助我們回到原型或達(dá)到某些給定的、預(yù)先確定的目的(telos) ，事實(shí)上它是在不斷發(fā)展的宇宙秩序背景下的一個臨時性的和生成性的過程。我和我的合作者們追隨葛蘭言（Marcel Granet）、唐君毅、費(fèi)孝通、李約瑟（Joseph Needham）和葛瑞漢（Angus Graham），主張將這種世界觀作為理解古典儒學(xué)最合適的語境。
首先，我對比了古希臘本體論意義上的“人”（human beings）概念與《易經(jīng)》中我稱之為過程性的“成人”（human becomings）概念，即作為“存在本身科學(xué)”的“本體論”（on-tology）和我稱為“生存藝術(shù)”的“生生論”（zoe-tology）之間的對比，也是作為名詞的“人”（human being）與作為動名詞的“人”（human becomings）的對比。約翰?杜威（John Dewey）摒棄他所謂的“哲學(xué)謬論”（the philosophical fallacy），并提出了類似觀點(diǎn)，提醒我們注意那些固化的習(xí)慣和經(jīng)驗(yàn)，即在經(jīng)驗(yàn)連續(xù)體當(dāng)中，把某個元素剝離語境并加以本質(zhì)化。我們需要竭盡全力克服這種事后的因果重構(gòu)（post hoc diremption），不要把這一同樣的元素視為根基性的或者因果性的。一個具體例子是，我們在學(xué)習(xí)過程中獲得了精湛的技巧，從這種持續(xù)經(jīng)歷的復(fù)雜性中抽象出一種稱為“德性”的東西，然后使之抽象成為過程本身的前因和后果。對于杜威來說：
實(shí)相就是成長過程本身……真正的存在是整個歷史全體，就像歷史是其所是一樣。將其分為兩部分，然后又不得不借助因果力量將它們再次結(jié)合起來，二者都是武斷和無理的。
古希臘哲學(xué)家為我們提供了基于“作為存在的存在”（being qua being）或“由于自身的存在”（being per se）的實(shí)體本體論，該本體論保障人類經(jīng)驗(yàn)有一個永恒不變的主體作為基石。隨著“理念”和“目的”作為獨(dú)立事物的形式因和目的因，如人這種基礎(chǔ)性的“實(shí)體”（substance）必定會在變化過程中持續(xù)存在。杜威所關(guān)注的“哲學(xué)謬論”恰是基于這種因果思維。在這種本體論中，“存在（to exist）”和“是”（to be）是一個術(shù)語的不同側(cè)面。相同的系動詞（be）回答了兩個問題，首先是某物“為何”（why）存在，即其起源和目的是什么，然后是它是“什么”（what），即其實(shí)質(zhì)是什么。這個基礎(chǔ)或本質(zhì)包含了其存在的目的，并且定義了任何特定事物的“成為這類事物的意謂的某一類”（what it means to be a thing of this kind），從而為其設(shè)定了封閉的、排他性的邊界，以及它必須是這樣而不是那樣所需的嚴(yán)格同一性。
關(guān)于某物為何（why）存在的問題可以訴諸于對確定的、源初的和不可證明的第一性原理來回答，并在造物主和被造物之間提供形而上的分離。關(guān)于某物是什么（what）的問題，可以通過其限度和定義來回答，并提供了實(shí)體與偶性之間、本質(zhì)與其偶然屬性之間的本體論區(qū)別。在表達(dá)事物的必要性、自足性和獨(dú)立性時，作為謂語主體的實(shí)質(zhì)或本質(zhì)是知識的對象。它告訴我們——一個邏輯必然性的問題——某物是什么，并且向我們確定地揭示什么是真實(shí)的，什么不是事實(shí)的真理之源。正如當(dāng)代哲學(xué)家趙汀陽給出了正面的回答，這種實(shí)體本體論定義了真實(shí)存在（構(gòu)成有序和結(jié)構(gòu)化宇宙內(nèi)容）：“西方哲學(xué)是對世界的‘字典式’解釋，試圖建立界定萬物的確定理解，簡單地說，就是斷定‘什么是什么’，一切觀念皆為‘在／是’(being/is) 的注腳?！?o:p>
在《易經(jīng)》中，我們找到了一個詞匯表，這些詞匯做出了明確的宇宙論假設(shè)，這些假設(shè)可以明確替代實(shí)體本體論，即通過定位一個整體、有機(jī)和生態(tài)的世界觀來提供儒家經(jīng)典的解釋背景。這種宇宙觀從“生”作為變化背后的動力開始，給我們提供了一個無限的“生成”世界：不是“存在的物”，而是正在發(fā)生的（happening）“事”?！拔ㄓ写嬖诖嬖凇保╫nly Being is）的本體論直觀是巴門尼德論真理之路的核心，也是由此產(chǎn)生的本體論的基礎(chǔ)。為了與“存在”或“存在”這一基本假設(shè)提供有意義的對比，我們可以借用古希臘的“生命”或“生活”概念，創(chuàng)造新詞“生生論”（zoe-tology）作為“生活的藝術(shù)”。與希臘“本體論”相對的“zoe-tology”可以譯成現(xiàn)代漢語“生生論”?！兑讉鳌氛J(rèn)為“天地之大德曰生”，宇宙最大的能力就是它的生生之力。同樣，在描述重要的“道”（way-making）時，它提到“生生之謂易”，即生命不斷產(chǎn)生和創(chuàng)造?！耙住北旧肀幌笳餍缘囟x，因此具體地被定義為創(chuàng)生性生活。
在《易經(jīng)》這本生態(tài)宇宙學(xué)著作中，自然創(chuàng)生、交互性的變化同時性地“依境而生”，并歷時性地“依緣而生”，在構(gòu)成經(jīng)驗(yàn)的重要情境關(guān)系中迅速而有利地增長。事物在它們的本構(gòu)關(guān)系中表達(dá)，在共同利益的相互作用不斷增長，并在為自身和世界增添價值的意義上“欣賞”它們。正如人類的繁榮源于家庭和社群關(guān)系的積極正向發(fā)展一樣，宇宙的繁榮是同構(gòu)的，是這種交易增長的延伸，只不過是在更廣闊的范圍內(nèi)。事實(shí)上，人類的價值觀和道德宇宙秩序都立足于生命及其生生性增長，因此彼此之間相互補(bǔ)充。
本書從教育學(xué)到倫理學(xué)，從家庭觀到宇宙論，反復(fù)討論了儒家文化各個側(cè)面的一個最重要共同點(diǎn)，這個共同點(diǎn)就是基于關(guān)系建構(gòu)的“人”的概念（relationally-constituted conception of persons）。我提出一個論點(diǎn)，即儒家哲學(xué)對我們時代的最重要貢獻(xiàn)，恰恰是它自己對基于關(guān)系建構(gòu)的“人”的精細(xì)的、復(fù)雜的、合乎道德的定義，可以作為批判和挑戰(zhàn)根深蒂固的個人主義意識形態(tài)基礎(chǔ)。尤其是在我們可以相當(dāng)程度上預(yù)測世界文化秩序不斷發(fā)生的巨變的關(guān)鍵時刻，正是這種“成人”（human becomings）可以成為“人”的替代觀念，將明確向我們預(yù)示，如果我們讓儒家學(xué)說有一席之地，這個世界將變得更好。
這部著作的論點(diǎn)并不是說，我所倡導(dǎo)的儒家價值觀可以解決世界上所有的問題。也不是說，不可避免的西方化勢力是有害的，需要以某種方式加以遏制。相反，我試圖引起人們對儒家傳統(tǒng)的關(guān)注，在人類歷史上生存狀況最戲劇性變化即將出現(xiàn)之際，我們應(yīng)該努力地讓我們所擁有的各種文化資源都得到利用。在許多方面，本書提出的立場是輔助性的，我們試圖克服那種對古老傳統(tǒng)不加批判的忽視所帶來的無知，而這一傳統(tǒng)對世界四分之一的人口來說不可或缺。儒家傳統(tǒng)文化有很多值得珍視的東西，它可以成為豐富世界文化的源泉，也可以實(shí)質(zhì)性地批判我們現(xiàn)有的錯誤的價值觀，這個世界因此可以變得比我們想象中的更好。
（黃天夷 譯 溫海明 校）
責(zé)任編輯：近復(fù)
微信公眾號
儒家網(wǎng)
青春儒學(xué)
民間儒行
微信公眾號
儒家網(wǎng)
青春儒學(xué)
民間儒行